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The debate over multiculturalism has arguably provided a concrete as well as 
theoretically fruitful way of developing the arguments between liberals and 
communitarians of the 1980s and early 1990s. As Will Kymlicka suggested early on, 
discussions over cultural plurality “go to the heart of the liberal conception of the 
relationship between self and community.”1 Alan Patten’s carefully argued, and 
though-provoking, Equal Recognition2 signals from its very title the ambition to draw 
from and somewhat reconcile the moral insights of both traditions, in an attempt to 
offer the philosophical foundations for what he calls “the strong cultural rights thesis” 
(ER, 10). Such an attempt is done primarily from a liberal egalitarian perspective of 
the Rawlsian kind. Other contributions to this symposium deal more directly with the 
specifics of Patten’s strong cultural rights thesis; here I wish to take a broader view on 
whether Equal Recognition offers a distinctive liberal theory, one that makes space 
for the language of recognition, while further elaborating the relationship between self 
and community from a liberal egalitarian position. 
The basic intuition underlying the book is that a well-ordered multicultural 
society needs to provide a strong array of rights and policies that give cultural 
minorities a fair chance to lead a meaningful life without necessarily having to 
abandon, or fundamentally compromise, their particular attachments to their own 
cultural lineage, since such cultural linage is constitutive of their own sense of 
identity and of the way in which they may wish to shape their own life. Such rights 
and policies are meant to provide a fair background for cultural minorities to feel at 
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home in a multicultural political society, but should not be directly aimed at the 
preservation of the cultural institutions, traditions and contexts of minorities, if not in 
so far as these are sustained by the social choices of the members of the cultural 
minority operating within the larger multicultural society. As Patten argues, the 
general theory of justice here proposed in order to sustain equal recognition for 
cultural minorities is proceduralist, but accommodating to the demands of culture. In 
its procedural form, it upholds important liberal principles, such as personal 
autonomy, responsibility for one’s own choices, and fairness of treatment; because of 
its accommodating intentions, it is sensitive to the way in which autonomy and 
responsibility need appropriate social contexts and conditions for them to be exercised 
meaningfully. 
This dual character of equal recognition is implicitly reflected in the two-step 
strategy that Patten’s argument follows in trying to establish the moral foundations for 
minority rights. First, he accepts that a “standard” liberal egalitarian theory of justice 
along Rawlsian lines offers a prima facie ground for the fair and equal treatment of all 
citizens, including cultural minorities; but, secondly, he suggests that for the treatment 
of minorities to be equal, and the accommodation of their interests to be fair, the 
standard liberal theory needs to be integrated with some further principles. This gives 
rise to his distinction between basic and full liberal proceduralism.  
For Patten, basic liberal proceduralism establishes the fair background 
conditions for voluntary social cooperation in a context in which individuals and 
groups can pursue their own conceptions of the good. He identifies such basic 
proceduralism with the “standard package of liberal rights” (ER 150), comprising 
basic liberties, freedom from discrimination, social minimum, and policies of fair 
equal opportunity. More generally, he identifies basic liberal proceduralism with 
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Rawls’s “pure procedural justice” and his two principles of justice (ER 29-30, and 
note 39). Quoting from Brian Barry’s own defence of a basic procedural position, 
Patten seems to accept that from such a perspective “the basic subject of fairness … is 
the distribution of rights, resources and opportunities.”3 Where does this leave strong 
cultural rights? 
The basic package, so Patten argues, does not offer solid enough ground for 
fairness when we come to cultural minority rights. This is why we need to extend it to 
a “full liberal proceduralism”, by specifically incorporating cultural rights (ER 152). 
Indeed, in talking about the project of the book, Patten says that he wishes to treat 
“equal recognition as an additional element that ought to go into a satisfactory 
specification of fair background conditions, when thinking about procedural justice 
under conditions of cultural diversity” (ER 30, emphasis added). In a footnote to the 
same passage, he suggests that the standard fair conditions of equal liberties and 
mutual toleration, which Rawls posits for comprehensive conceptions of the good 
(including those associated to cultural ways of life), need to be extended so to include 
the requirement to equal recognition (ER 30, footnote 39). 
It would be possible to suggest that full liberal proceduralism is an ad hoc 
extension of the Rawlsian framework for justice as fairness, or, more generally, of 
impartialist and proceduralist liberal theories, in order to include a specific class of 
rights, cultural rights, which are justified by the special conditions of “cultural 
diversity.” I think we should resist such an interpretation, firstly because in Patten’s 
account cultural rights and equal recognition are subsumed within more general 
categories; secondly, because equal recognition is the specification of the principle of 
“neutrality of treatment” (ER 159), which would not seem to apply to minority culture 
issues alone. Moreover, culture, though for Patten more appropriately defined as a 
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“precipitate of a shared formative context,” is described as something akin to a 
personal conception of the good, and this is what makes it an appropriate “object” for 
recognition and neutrality of treatment. Hence, “full liberal proceduralism” is neither 
a theory that applies exclusively to cultural rights nor entirely dependent on the 
specific conditions of multicultural societies. It follows that there must be something 
more fundamentally problematic with “basic liberal proceduralism,” something that 
needs addressing by extending it to a “fuller” version, particularly, but not 
exclusively, when dealing with cultural rights. 
One obvious candidate for such an extension of liberal proceduralism is 
Patten’s distinctive analysis of neutrality, which he develops at length in Chapter 4 as 
a prelude of his analysis of equal recognition. There, he advances an interpretation of 
state’s neutrality as based neither on intentions nor on effects, but on how the state 
treats different conceptions of the good by promoting policies that either assist or 
hinder particular conceptions. The focus of neutrality of treatment is on the policies 
themselves, and how successful the liberal state is in devising policies capable of 
equally accommodating different conceptions of the good and ways of life (ER 115). 
Patten’s discussion of neutrality is both complex and intriguing. He tries to steer a 
middle path between intentions and effects, but cannot avoid considering either when 
defining how policies provide fairness of treatment. Clearly, any policy has an aim 
and a related justification, which Patten distinguishes as two aspects of neutrality of 
intentions (ER 112). It is relatively easy to disentangle the aims and justifications that 
support a particular conception of the good, from the aim to treat different 
conceptions equally and neutrally, in cases in which the state abstains from acting. 
The distinction works less well with more pro-active policies, or policies of 
accommodation, such as those that neutrality of treatment seems to take on board. 
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These involve more fine-tuned considerations of what may promote and 
accommodate a particular conception of the good, and therefore a need to understand 
such a conception more from the inside, so to speak, making also inevitable more 
substantive judgements of value. Moreover, as Patten readily admits, a certain 
consideration of the effects of a policy, at least in terms of how it may directly effect 
the realizability of a particular conception of the good, cannot be entirely ignored 
when considering issues of neutrality of treatment (ER 116).  Neither of these 
difficulties makes Patten’s idea of neutrality of treatment less distinctive or 
unworkable. Nonetheless, they point to the fact that subtle (pragmatic?) kind of 
judgements are often required in order to devise policies that are neutral, while at the 
same time sensitive to what the policy is in fact promoting (its aim-function); and 
how the policy outputs have some relevance in assessing the appropriateness of policy 
inputs (its effect-function). Neutrality of treatment involves some situated kind of 
judgement and ultimately a reference to some more fundamental kind of principle or 
consideration of equality. 
Indeed, as Patten says, neutrality of treatment should be considered a 
downstream principle (ER 108-111). Fair and neutral treatment is owed to people 
because they have a strong claim to (a vital interest in) a fair opportunity for self-
determination, which is more of an upstream value. Besides, in order to make 
judgements on how different conceptions of the good can be treated fairly in relation 
to each other (and therefore treated neutrally from the state’s perspective), one needs 
to assume a “baseline.” Since Patten effectively excludes the “do-nothing” option as a 
fall-back position, his view of the baseline is that this should “reflect the guiding idea 
of fair opportunity for self-determination” (ER 118). The latter, rather than neutrality 
of treatment, seems a more appropriate candidate for the foundation of a full 
	 6	
procedural liberalism. To extend the basic version, we may need to dig deeper in what 
self-determination entails. 
Patten explains both the general and the specific grounds for the strong 
interest citizens have in self-determination, and why therefore the state needs to 
provide a fair opportunity for them to exercise such a capacity (ER 131-36). The more 
general interest consists in the entanglement between self-interest and well-being and 
in the intrinsic value of self-determination, in the sense of autonomous control over 
the attempt to direct one’s own life. The more specific interest consists in the fact that 
there are aspects of one’s conception of the good that are particularly vital to one’s 
own integrity as a person and which people should have a fair chance to pursue 
according to their own judgment. In the section in which the “value” of self-
determination is discussed (ER 4.6), Patten resists a perfectionist reading of it. In so 
far as this value may play a central role in the “extension” of basic liberal 
proceduralism, it would seem to be in broad agreement with Rawls’s own attempt in 
Political liberalism.4 Is this sufficient? It would seem to me that in order for full 
liberal proceduralism to be convincing, a number of issues about fair opportunity for 
self-determination may need to be engaged more fully, though the book does so 
implicitly in a number of places. 
I can only here very briefly indicate what these issues are. Let me take, first, 
the general grounds for self-determination. The entanglement between self-interest 
and well-being is clearly acknowledged as a problem by Rawls in his discussion of 
how to define a basic list of primary goods. In Political Liberalism, he talks about 
“the many significant variations among persons in their capacity ... and in their 
determinate conceptions of the good, as well as in preferences and tastes,”5 and how a 
basic list of primary goods may be insufficient to do justice to the variety of needs 
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involved by the diversity of capacities and personal aims. This is the general problem 
of interpersonal comparison, which takes a particular form with regard to intercultural 
comparison. The congruence of the basic list of primary goods, which I take 
approximates Patten’s baseline, in relation to the opportunities it offers for self-
determination, may be put into question because it fails to capture fully the way in 
which needs are culturally determined. Moreover, as Amartya Sen has suggested, 
primary goods on their own are not sufficient as indicators for individual’s real 
opportunities, since an account of the capability (or capability set) necessary to 
convert opportunities into personal ends is also required.6 Rawls’s own answer to 
these considerations is that, in political liberalism, one assumes that citizens have 
different capacities, but that they have “at least to the essential minimum degree” the 
capacity to be “fully cooperating member of society over a complete life,” and that 
this sets the limits of what is “the political and the practicable” in defining the basic 
resources for citizens to be treated as free and equal.7It would seem to me that this 
still leaves plenty of scope for dispute over the entanglement between self-interest and 
well-being, and its significance for self-determination. In Patten’s case, it could be 
argued that one needs a more developed conception of what self-determination entails 
in general terms, in order to provide full liberal proceduralism with a proper 
foundation for strong cultural rights. 
Secondly, one can look more closely at the specific grounds for the value of 
self-determination, and how one’s conception of the good (of which identification 
with one’s cultural lineage may be a manifestation) relates to the integrity of a person. 
On this Patten has more to say throughout the book, particularly when he tries to 
distinguish his full version of liberal proceduralism from the basic version defended 
by Brian Barry in Culture and Equality with respect to the argument about “expensive 
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tastes” (ER 177-82).8 Barry’s objection to the kind of strong multicultural rights 
defended by Patten hinges on a naïve conception of equality in front of the law, which 
fails to recognize that any law is burdensome to some particular group, and this also 
applies to “citizens with particular beliefs, preferences, or circumstances” (ER 178).9 
Patten’s rejoinder is that his own conception of equal recognition does not deny the 
social division of responsibility, and the capacity of individuals to revise their 
preferences and conceptions of the good during the course of their life also in 
consideration of likely costs and opportunities. Because of the proceduralist character 
of his theory, Patten discounts the fact that equal recognition may not be able to 
guarantee the survival and flourishing of all cultures and permissible ways of 
conducting one’s life, if the social costs for the rest of the community are unfair, as in 
the case of the expensive tastes argument.  
He rejects, however, the idea that justice sole requirement is the provision of 
an equal baseline (rights, resources, opportunities), without “responsiveness to actual 
preferences and beliefs about value” (ER 179). He suggests that Barry’s argument 
fails to take on board that “choices taken under unfair or unreasonable conditions do 
not generate responsibility,” and that fair background conditions need to be in some 
way “responsive” to the conceptions of the good people have in the first place (ER 
179-80). As a further elaboration of this point, and as a way of showing that such 
“accommodating approach to certain preferences” is in line with mainstream liberal 
views, Patten makes use of Dworkin’s “principle of abstraction,” which suggests that 
there is a previous stage to a fair process of distribution of resources, as the one of 
Dworkin’s imaginary auction, and that this consists in setting up prior background 
conditions determining the kind of goods available, without the nature of them being 
prejudicial to the kind of opportunities available to the people engaged in the auction 
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itself (ER 180-82). In the case cited by Patten, the prior background conditions 
involve either the size (large vs. small lots of land) or the kind (luxury vs. staple food) 
of goods available for the auction, so that different people have all a fair opportunity 
to benefit from the fair process of distribution. Patten considers Dworkin’s “principle 
of abstraction” as a form of responsiveness to people’s prior preferences, or at least to 
some relevant ones.  
This raises the further question of what precise class of preferences, beliefs, 
styles of life should be considered for prior accommodation, so that the background 
conditions are fair. In Political Liberalism, Rawls deals with the problem of the 
variations in people’s capacities and their conceptions of the good by distinguishing 
four different classes: a)moral and intellectuals, b) physical, c) conceptions of the 
good, d) tastes and preferences.10 Leaving aside the first two, Rawls considers the 
latter (d) as entirely the responsibility of the individual and therefore not needing 
special accommodation; but conceptions of the good require a more considered 
treatment, since they are closer to the person’s moral capacity.11 For Rawls, they need 
to be accommodated not to the point of absolute protection, since no society can 
reasonably contain all forms of life, but only in so far as the realization of the 
principles of political liberalism in institutions “specifies fair background conditions 
for different and even antagonistic conceptions of the good to be affirmed and 
pursued.”12 Rawls’s solution seems to me inadequate for the purposes of Patten’s full 
liberal proceduralism, at least for two reasons. Rawls’s test of whether fair 
background conditions for self-determination exist seems to be dependent on the 
possibility that they effectively work as such, while Patten suggests that we need 
some way of being responsive in the very establishment of the fair background 
conditions. The other reason is that Rawls’s way of looking at conceptions of the 
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good, and subordinately to strong belief systems and ways of life, both of which can 
be associated to cultural lineages, would seem to downplay the identity-related 
aspects of the conception of the good, the special commitments, that Patten think 
offers specific ground for self-determination. There is ground here not only for a 
(relative, not absolute, in my view) distinction between preferences and tastes on one 
side, and conceptions of good on the other; but for a much more fine-grained 
differentiation between a variety of aspects and manifestations of ways of life that 
may contribute to our self-understanding and how we conceive, view and select our 
different aims throughout the course of our life.  
The fine-grained analysis of the various aspects of our conception of the good, 
the extent to which these are identity-related and therefore less subject to revision or 
personal responsibility, and, finally, the way in which such conceptions need to be 
factored in for devising fair background conditions, all of this may require a great deal 
of contextual judgement, similar to the one we said was needed for the 
disentanglement of self-interest and well-being in defining what self-determination 
consists in. As Sen suggests, there may be no “royal road” to evaluation in such 
matters.13 Perhaps we need a more modest way of dealing with the problems of 
cultural rights, self-determination, and institutional accommodation. One rich in the 
kind of arguments and nuanced distinctions that Equal Recognition offers in 
abundance; but less confident that our arguments are basic and not always in some 
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